Providing managers with stock in the firm may help ensure that managers act in the shareholders' interest. The level of managerial stock ownership, however, is not generally controlled by the firm's compensation committee. Rather, managers themselves determine the level of their stock holdings. To date, though, little evidence exists on managers' personal transactions and how these trades affect their overall equity holdings. This analysis provides insight on the trading practices of bank managers.
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I. Introduction
Evidence from Murphy (1985) and Benston (1985) suggests managers' wealth is highly sensitive to nonsystematic risk. These authors show that year-to-year changes in the value of managers' stock holdings often far exceed the managers' annual remuneration. Why managers are willing to expose much of their wealth to firm-specific risk is an open question. The conjecture of this paper is that managers alter their share holdings in response to changes in the firm's prospects. By opportunistically trading their firms' shares, managers mitigate the adverse effects of such undiversified positions in their firm. The cost of poor diversification is lower for managers who can accurately predict share price changes and reallocate their portfolio weights in response to such expected share price changes. In this paper, I examine the extent to which top executives in the banking industry alter their share holdings such that they reduce their exposure to nonsystematic risk of their firms.
Examining this issue is important since managerial stock ownership is the primary means through which managers' wealth is linked to firm value (Murphy 1985 and Benston 1985) .
Linking managerial wealth to firm value limits the agency costs that arise from separating ownership and control and thus helps to ensure that managers act in the shareholders' interest.
Despite the pivotal role of managerial stock ownership, however, little evidence exists on how managers come to have such large holdings and to what extent managers personally alter these stock holdings. Some recent evidence by Yermack (1997) shows that CEOs do influence the timing of their stock option awards and thus the terms of their own compensation. By examining the role managers play in determining their stock holdings in their firm and the extent to which managers alter these stock holdings, this study provides further evidence on corporate managers' 4 ability to influence their terms of compensation.
Most existing studies examining managerial stock ownership use data from a firm's proxy statement. Managerial holdings are defined as the total number of shares held by management as of the proxy statement date. This data source has two deficiencies. First, intra-year changes in managerial holdings cannot be ascertained from proxy data. Since timely trades can significantly alter managers' financial ties to their firms, it is important to examine intra-year transactions.
Second, year-to-year changes in stock holdings obtained from proxy data cannot identify the sources of these changes. Whether managers are individually deciding to increase/decrease their holdings via open market transactions or accumulating shares via a company compensation plan is not generally addressed in studies using proxy data. To overcome these deficiencies, I use an alternative data source: the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings. These data track individual managers' transactions throughout the year and allow one to differentiate between managerial discretionary trades and shares acquired via a company plan.
I isolate my analysis to executives in the banking industry to assure data accuracy. Since the SEC data were not gathered for purposes of tracking a manager's trades through time but rather for disclosure of contemporaneous trades, concentrating the analysis to a specific industry, where I could verify data accuracy, was imperative. By cross-checking the SEC data with available banking industry reports (such as SNL Securities' Quarterly Bank Digest) I am confident the data are accurate. Thus, this analysis provides a case study of managers' influence over their stock holdings in the firms they manage.
In addition, managerial stock ownership is particularly important in the banking industry Other factors that affect the bank's risk-taking decisions include the charter value of the bank (Keely 1990) 1 and capitalization of the bank (Kane 1985) , as well as regulatory constraints placed on certain banking activities (Buser, Chen, and Kane 1981) . It is commonly accepted that when a bank is close to insolvency, managers have an incentive to increase the riskiness of the bank's portfolio in a last chance attempt to save the firm and their jobs.
A recent paper by Houston and James (1995) examines the relationship between managerial compensation policies and risk-taking in the banking industry. They find no evidence that such policies promote risk-taking. Other recent studies of managerial compensation in the industry include Hubbard and Palia (1995) and Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles (1995) . These studies examine managerial stock holdings as part of overall compensation. In contrast to these studies, I examine the extent to which managers personally influence their level of stock holdings. because of the current regulatory environment. Fixed-rate deposit insurance has been recognized as providing an incentive for bank shareholders to prefer a riskier banking institution than they would in the absence of this insurance (Merton 1977; Marcus and Shaked 1984; Ronn and Verma 1986) . Whether banks fully exploit the risk-taking incentives will depend in part on the incentives bank managers have to operate a risky institution (Benston et al. 1986 ). Managers who hold 1 poorly diversified portfolios, consisting primarily of shares in the firm they manage, are not likely to operate an excessively risky institution because of the high downside costs of such operating decisions. In contrast, managers who opportunistically alter their stock holdings in the firm can limit the downside costs of risky activities while taking advantage of the upside benefits.
Therefore, in addition to providing insights into managers' ability to personally influence their stock holdings, this analysis provides further evidence on whether bank managers' compensation encourages them to exploit the risk-taking incentives associated with fixed-rate deposit insurance. In addition, I find that managers alter their holdings when the firm's prospects change.
Managers consistently take advantage of private firm-specific information, earning positive abnormal returns on open market purchases while avoiding negative abnormal returns on open market sales. This type of opportunistic trading is consistent with managers shielding their wealth from poor firm performance while exploiting opportunities to increase their exposure to strong firm performance. Managers appear to "fine tune" the proportion of their wealth that is sensitive to changes in firm value. Interpreted this way, managers in effect increase the rate of return on their holdings while reducing the riskiness of holding those shares. This increased return/risk trade-off, available to managers who trade shares in their firm, may help explain why many managers are willing to hold what appears to be an undiversified stake in their firm.
II. Factors Influencing Managerial Stock Ownership
Managerial Stock Ownership
For many senior managers, the dollar value of their stock holdings in their firm is large. Benston (1985) and Murphy (1985) show that year-to-year changes in the value of these holdings often far exceed a manager's annual remuneration. These conditions, along with the fact that most The existence of large dollar holdings does not of itself indicate poor diversification. For very wealthy 2 managers, holdings in their firm may only account for a small percentage of their portfolio and thus they may in fact hold well-diversified portfolios. However, since the value of managers' equity holdings often dwarfs annual remuneration (Benston 1985) , it is unlikely that the majority of managers are wealthy enough to hold well-diversified portfolios. managers' human capital is primarily in firm-specific form, open up the possibility that managers' personal wealth is highly sensitive to nonsystematic risk. Why are managers willing to hold what 2 appear to be poorly diversified portfolios? A possible explanation is high agency costs (see Fama 1980; and Jensen and Meckling 1976; Demsetz and Lehn 1985) . If the benefits of maintaining close control of the decisions of the firm exceed the costs of poor diversification, owners are willing to hold a large dollar value of stock holdings and manage the firm themselves; as the manager/owner distinction disappears, by definition, so do the agency costs. This is true, however, only if a high dollar-value in stock holdings translates into a large percentage of the firm's outstanding shares. For many firms, managers have large dollar holdings but only a small percentage of the outstanding shares. In these cases, portfolio selection theory suggests that the return/risk trade-off of the firm's shares would have to be quite high to justify such holdings.
Conventional return/risk trade-off of shares of publicly traded firms would not seem to justify management's willingness to have large holdings.
One explanation of large managerial holdings is that these large dollar-value positions stem from an optimal contracting process between management and compensation committees.
Pay packages must be designed so that managers' certainty-equivalent wage exceeds managers' reservation wages. Many packages include stock ownership, because of the beneficial incentive effects of linking managerial pay to firm performance. However, since the value of shares is uncertain, packages that include stock ownership need a large dollar-value position if the entire pay package is to produce a high enough certainty-equivalent wage to exceed managers' Examining how managers acquire and dispose of shares in their firm is important, because the ability to alter one's share holdings may affect managerial operating decisions. Theoretical research on insider trading has examined these incentive effects (Bebchuk and Fershtman 1994; Bagnoli and Khanna 1992) . In general, these studies show that insider trading benefits shareholders if trading profits induce risk-averse managers to abandon an overly conservative investment policy. On the other hand, insider trading imposes costs on shareholders when trading 9 Since securities law restrict managers from selling their firm's shares short, managers only have put-like 3 options for the shares they own. Conversely, there are no restrictions on the number of shares a manager can purchase and thus fewer limits on the call-like options. Therefore, since managers hold more call-like options than put-like options, technically, a long straddle is not a perfect description of the value of managers' ability to purchase and sell shares in the firm using private information. However, since a more accurate specification would increase the complexity of the analysis without providing much additional value to the descriptive nature of the analysis, I use the long straddle analogy.
profits induce managers to make operating decisions that increase the volatility of their firm's return but fail to maximize the firm's value.
To clarify how managers' altering their stock holdings could affect their operating decisions, consider the following example. It is an alternative interpretation of the analytical model of Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994) . Management's ability to buy or sell shares at the current share price, the price not incorporating their private information, can be interpreted as providing both call-like and put-like options for the managers. When a manager is hired, access to private firmspecific information provides call-like options, since managers have the ability to purchase shares at times when the firm's share price undervalues the firm's true worth. The call-like feature stems from the ability to purchase shares at current prices instead of those that eventually prevail when the private information becomes public knowledge. After obtaining shares in the firm, managers with access to private, firm-specific information also receive a put-like option for each share owned, since managers can sell shares at times when the share price overvalues the true worth of the firm instead of at the price that eventually prevails when the private information becomes public.
Holding both a call and a put option with the same exercise price, in this case the share price that does not incorporate their private information, resembles a strategy known as a long straddle. Holding a straddle is a useful strategy for investors who expect the share price to move 3 10 a lot but are uncertain as to the direction. Higher volatility in the share price translates to an increased value of the straddle. In this context, the implicit straddle, whose value increases with the volatility of the firm's share price, may induce managers to increase the riskiness of the firm.
However, if the percentage of shares the managers are willing to trade is small in comparison to their stock holdings, it is unlikely this trading strategy would induce increased risk-taking.
Whether or not managers trade enough shares for this issue to be a concern is an empirical question this paper helps address.
Using detailed data on managers' stock holdings, I attempt in this paper to answer the Empirical evidence, however, unanimously concludes that current legislation does not prevent insiders from profitably trading shares in their firm. Studies by Jaffe (1974 ), Seyhun (1986 , and Rozeff and Zaman (1988) show that, on average, insiders earn positive abnormal returns from their trades. Seyhun (1992) average, while the median manager holds 0.02 percent of the firm. As one might expect, the median "mature" manager holds more than three times the value of shares held by the median "new" manager.
Because my source of managerial stock holdings is the SEC Official Summary of Security
Transactions and Holdings, sample selection requires a manager to have at least one transaction during the sample period to be included in the study. Potentially this could create a sample selection bias, since only managers who have transactions are included in the sample. Fortunately, however, this is not likely to be a major issue, since virtually all large firms employ some type of compensation package that includes stock grants. In addition, the SEC data set includes managers reporting their initial stock ownership, managers whose firms issue stock dividends, and managers whose firms have a stock split, even if these managers have no other stock transaction. Thus, any sample selection bias is likely to be minimal. options. Thus, the stock holdings of the sampled managers should be less than those listed on the firm's proxy; however, non-option stock holdings should still represent a significant portion of managerial stock holdings.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the managers in this sample hold close to 8 percent of the outstanding shares, on average, of the firms they manage. According to the BHCs' proxy statements, the average is 11 percent. The difference can, potentially, be explained by option holdings. For those few firms that reported managerial holdings excluding options on their proxy statements, I compared the proxy statement percentages to those obtained from the sampled managers. In these cases, the two measures were closer than those reported in Table 1 . For example, Citicorp's proxy in 1989 reports officers and directors holding 1.50 percent of the outstanding shares in the firm, excluding options. Aggregating the Citicorp managers in my sample, these managers own 1.45 percent of the shares outstanding. Thus, with the recent trend toward equity-based compensation plans, it is unlikely that my data source and sample selection criteria present a significant sample selection bias. However, when interpreting the results of this paper, one should keep this possibility in mind.
Frequency and Size of Trades
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To what extent do bank managers alter their holdings in their firm*s shares? Table 2 presents Table 3 and Table 4 provide greater detail of the role open market purchases and sales play in determining a manager's share holdings. Table 3 propensity to make open market transactions across all three type of institutions (survived, acquired, and failed). I found that managers of failing BHCs had very few open market transactions and managers of acquired BHCs had relatively fewer transactions than surviving BHCs. A possible explanation for such results is that insider trading laws effectively deter trades that the SEC could easily determine were based on private information. Seyhun (1992) states that the majority of cases brought against corporate insiders were trades made immediately prior to a merger or acquisition announcement. He suggests case law effectively defined illegal insider trading as trades based on merger or acquisition information. Thus, inclusion of failed and acquired institutions makes it more difficult to find open market purchases and sales having a significant role in the determination of managerial stock holdings.
The change in a manager's total stock holdings is calculated as shares acquired via open market purchases, a 5 company plan, reinvestment of dividends, exercising options, gift, and "other" acquisitions less shares disposed of via open market sales, gift, and "other" dispositions over the sample period. For more detail on the size and frequency of these transactions, see Table 2 . the dollar value of transactions is higher for those managers in the highest quintile, but the effect on their overall stock holdings is less since they started out with much higher holdings. very large holdings recently became a member of the board of directors; 2) the "new" manager had been with the firm for a number of years but was recently promoted to a position where he was required to disclose all trades; 3) the "new" manager was brought in from the outside and just happened to hold shares in the firm. Table 3 ). The results show that these managers behave similarly to "mature" 
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(1) where the simple with-dividend return to security j on day t, the simple with-dividend return to the value-weighted portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange stocks on day t, the change in daily yields of one of two alternative interest rate series: DRI*s 3-month Treasury bill (bond equivalent) yield or DRI*s 10-year note yield series, the security-specific component of the return.
To check the robustness of the model specification, I also estimate the standard market model as well as a version of the market model that corrects for the possibility of nonsynchronous trading (see Scholes and Williams 1977) . The results of all specifications are qualitatively similar.
Therefore, to make the presentation of results manageable, I present only the findings for the twoindex model that specifies the interest factor as the change in the daily yield on the 3-month Treasury bill.
To be included in the analysis, a managerial transaction had to satisfy the data requirements for the following estimation technique. I estimate the parameters of all models using 242 daily returns, from day -252 to day -11. The abnormal return, , earned by manager j on day J is calculated for each model as the out-of-estimation-period prediction error:
The cumulative abnormal return for manager j, , is calculated as the sum of daily abnormal returns for various intervals around the event date:
.
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To examine managerial use of private information in their trades, I compute mean CARs as the simple average of individual manager CARs. The test-statistic for a CAR over an interval of N days is the ratio of the mean cumulative abnormal return to its estimated standard error. The estimated standard error is computed from the time series of mean abnormal returns from the estimation period for each transaction type. This test statistic is assumed unit normal in the absence of abnormal performance. For details of this test statistic, see Brown and Warner (1985) .
The results presented in Table 5 provide evidence of significant differences between transactions where managers have discretion over the timing of the trade and those where they do not. Panel A of Table 5 (Table 2) , the size (Tables 3 and 4) , and the profitability (Table 5 ) of managerial discretionary transactions provide strong evidence that managers opportunistically trade shares in their firms.
As discussed earlier, "new" managers may be required to purchase shares in order to build their ownership stake in the firm to a certain level. The above analysis included transactions by all managers. Therefore, some of the initial open market purchases by "new" managers that I have described as discretionary may actually have been required. One would not expect to find abnormal returns from these trades. To check this, I examined abnormal returns around open market purchases within two years of the initial reporting date of a "new" manager. As expected, no abnormal performance was found for these transactions.
Determinants of Managers' Decisions to Trade Shares
I have shown that, on average, managers earn abnormal profits on their discretionary trades and that these transactions constitute a significant proportion of stock holdings. However, this analysis is conditional on a trade occurring. It is possible that managers miss opportune times Also, to control for transactions made by "new" managers that may be required by the compensation committee, I include a variable that measures the number of years since the manager was first required to disclose his trading of shares in his own firm.
In addition to the shares managers already hold, compensation plans that include shares in the firm increase managers' exposure to firm-specific risk. One would expect, after controlling for other factors, that the more shares managers receive via a compensation plan the less likely it is that they will purchase additional shares and the more likely they will sell shares. To control for these factors, I include the natural logarithm of the dollar value of shares accrued via a plan or the percentage of shares outstanding that were acquired via a plan, depending on the model specification.
However, since managers who belong to a plan regularly receive shares, these managers may be more likely to participate in the opportunistic trading of their firm's shares. That is, given that part of managers' compensation will be exposed to the nonsystematic risk of the firm, they may be more likely to purchase shares at opportune times as well as sell shares at opportune times. To test this conjecture, I create a (1,0) dummy variable for whether a manager receives shares through a compensation plan and interact it with the return variable. If managers receiving 29 shares via a plan tend to participate more in the opportunistic trading of shares, one would expect them to be more sensitive to changes in the firm's stock return.
I develop the motivation for trading in terms of managers' reactions to their possibly undiversified holdings in their firms. However, additional factors influence the trading practices of bank managers. For example, firms whose shares are traded infrequently may have large bid-ask spreads that make the cost of trading too high for managers to earn profits. In contrast, managers of firms whose shares are traded frequently may have ample profit opportunities since they may be able to trade on the "noise" generated by liquidity traders. To control for these factors, I include as a variable the number of days within the year that the firm's shares have zero trading volume.
Another factor that may influence managerial trading is the role of outside monitors. There is evidence that shareholders who own large blocks of shares have a greater incentive to monitor the firm than shareholders who own smaller blocks. If this monitoring produces valuable firmspecific information, then as the percentage of institutional ownership increases so does the percentage of shareholders who have accurate information regarding the financial soundness of the firm. In this environment, a manager has fewer price-insensitive liquidity traders with whom to trade shares. As discussed above, this will lower management's ability to profitably trade shares.
To control for these factors, I include as a variable the percentage of shares owned by institutions.
The one additional control variable controls for firm size effects and is measured by the natural logarithm of the BHC's assets.
In this analysis, I examine managerial discretionary trading on a yearly basis for the period 1989 through 1993. My primary concern is examining the motives behind managers' decisions to increase or decrease their stock holdings in a particular year via open market transactions. A it is zero. The variable is the manager's firm's contemporaneous stock return (measured as the one-year raw return) while is the manager's firm's lagged return (measured as the lagged one-year raw return). is the vector of additional explanatory variables discussed above.
Since some of the factors in may affect managerial purchases and sales differently, I model the two transactions separately. Four different specifications are used for each model. These specifications differ in the way they measure a manager's stock holdings: either as the natural logarithm of the dollar value of shares held by the manager or as the percentage of firm's shares 31 held by the manager. The specifications also differ in that some include an interactive variable of the current stock return multiplied by a dummy indicating whether the manager receives shares from a compensation plan. Table 6 presents the results for open market purchases. Both the current year's stock return and the lagged year's return are inversely related to the probability of purchasing. The coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. This suggests that managers are purchasing shares after their firm's share price has fallen. If I change the current year's return from 0.15 to -0.15, the probability of purchasing shares increases by 24 percent (assuming specification 1 in Table 6 and all other variables are at sample means). These findings, along with the results from Table 5 showing positive abnormal returns earned by managers, are consistent with managerial opportunistic trading. Managers are more likely to purchase shares at low share prices in the hope of capturing profits from a price recovery. Table 7 Table 7 and all other variables are at sample means). This suggests managers sell after their firm's share price has risen. Taken together, the return coefficients in both the purchase and sale probits provide strong evidence that managers consistently take advantage of opportune times to trade their firms' shares.
Managers' concerns regarding the riskiness of holding shares are highlighted by the 32 negative and significant coefficient on the return variance variable in the purchase probit (Table   6 ). Managers of firms whose share price is highly variable are less likely to purchase additional shares. However, the coefficient on this variable is insignificant in the sale probit. There is also evidence that managers who are likely to face greater non-diversified risk are more likely to participate in the trading of shares. In both the purchase probit and the sale probit, the coefficient on the dollar value of managerial holdings is positive and significant. Similar results are found when managerial stock holdings are measured as the percentage of shares held. A quadratic is included in these specifications to account for a nonlinear relation. Again, in both the purchase probit and the sale probit, the coefficients on these variables suggest that managers with more exposure are more likely to participate in trading. However, the negative coefficient on the squared term suggests that managers who own a large percentage of the firm are less likely to participate. This could be indicating the benefits of control. Once managers own a significant percentage of a firm, the benefits of control may outweigh any other incentive to alter one's holdings.
How do managers react to receiving shares via a company compensation plan? Table 6 shows that receiving shares via a plan has no significant effect on the decision to purchase shares.
Regardless of the specification, all the compensation plan variables are insignificant. However, as evidence from the sale probit in Table 7 shows, the more shares acquired by a manager via a compensation plan, the more likely the manager is to sell shares. In addition, the variable that interacts the current year's stock return with a dummy indicating the manager received shares via a compensation plan is positive and significant (Table 7 , specifications 2 and 4). This shows that a manager who acquires shares via a compensation plan is more likely to sell shares for a given 33
However, a compensation committee may anticipate such trades by managers and take this into account when 7 they determine their compensation policy.
change in the firm's share price than a manager who is not part of a formal stock compensation plan, additional evidence that managers do not rely solely on the compensation committee to determine their stock holdings. In fact, the evidence suggests that managers may act to offset a compensation committee's goals regarding managerial stock ownership. Evidence from this section suggests managers consistently respond to changes in their firm's share price by altering their equity holdings in the firm. Managers who likely face the greatest exposure to the nonsystematic risk of their firms are also more likely to make discretionary purchases as well as discretionary sales.
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
The assumption that managerial stock holdings are determined by the firm's compensation committee is shown to be inaccurate. Finally, the trading patterns found provide insights as to the concerns bank managers place on preserving their personal wealth. Managers who consistently make alterations to their personal holdings, effectively "fine-tuning" the return they receive on their total portfolio, suggest that they are willing to take actions to avert downward fluctuations in the value of their shares. This is 35 inconsistent with a type of manager who would be willing to make excessively risky operating decisions for his or her firm that would make a personal financial portfolio very risky. This has implications in the debate regarding the risk-taking incentives of deposit insurance. Since the incentives bank managers have to operate a risky institution will determine whether banks fully exploit the risk-taking incentives of deposit insurance, it is unlikely that managers who make the effort to "fine-tune" their personal holdings would also be willing to take excessive risks in the firms they manage that would also increase the riskiness of their personal holdings. Of course, this assumes a healthy banking institution. Managers of banks whose market value of equity has dropped to the point where the firm is close to insolvency will have incentives to increase the riskiness of their institution in a last effort to rescue the firm, since the cost of this increased riskiness will be incurred primarily by the deposit insurer. Nevertheless, the evidence provided in this analysis suggests that these managers are very concerned with preserving the value of their wealth. Such behavior is inconsistent with managers taking excessive risks to exploit the risktaking incentives of deposit insurance. Note: t-values in parentheses. Calculated as in Brown and Warner (1986) .
